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Abstract
 
Henri Bergson’s philosophy, which Sartre studied as a student, had a
profound but largely neglected influence on his thinking. In this paper I focus
on the new light that recognition of this influence throws on Sartre’s central
argument about the relationship between negation and nothingness in his
 
Being and Nothingness
 
. Sartre’s argument is in part a response to Bergson’s
dismissive, eliminativist account of nothingness in 
 
Creative Evolution
 
 (1907):
the objections to the concept of nothingness with which Sartre engages are
precisely those raised by Bergson. Even if Sartre’s account of nothingness in
its entirety is found to be flawed, I argue that the points he makes specifically
against Bergson are powerful.
My discussion concludes with a brief examination of the wider philosophical
background to Sartre’s and Bergson’s discussion of nothingness: here I point
to some important aspects of Sartre’s early philosophy, including some
features of his conception of nothingness, that may testify to Bergson’s posi-
tive influence on his thought.
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§1 Introduction
 
Sartre’s remarkable capacity to absorb and transform the ideas of other
philosophers has often been noticed. The standard presentation of his early
philosophy, as inaugurating a distinctive ‘existentialist’ turn within the
phenomenological tradition, implicitly acknowledges this capacity.
However, the attention paid to these many influences on his thinking has
been uneven, and the impact of Henri Bergson in particular has been under-
estimated, especially within the Anglophone literature.
Part of the reason for this must lie in the fact that Sartre himself, espe-
cially in his best-known philosophical writings of the period leading up to
and including 
 
Being and Nothingness
 
 (hereafter 
 
BN
 
), refers most frequently
to Husserl, Hegel and Heidegger. The early phenomenological writings are
presented as attempts to apply (a corrected version of) Husserl’s method
within the study of the emotions, imagination and the self, and, in 
 
BN
 
, the
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huge impact of Heidegger’s ontological orientation is obvious. As the
precursors in relation to whom Sartre most often explicitly contrasts his
position in 
 
BN
 
 are these ‘three Hs’, it is perhaps not surprising that many
commentators have allowed their historical understanding of Sartre’s think-
ing to be correspondingly defined. (An example of a study explicitly
restricted to the ‘three Hs’ is Schroeder’s (1984) comparative account of
Sartre’s theory of intersubjectivity, entitled 
 
Sartre and his Predecessors
 
.)
Nonetheless, although Sartre may refer to Bergson less often, he engages
with his thinking repeatedly. In particular, the long chapter devoted to
Bergson’s theory of images in Sartre’s first book about the imagination
(Sartre, 1962, first published in 1936) shows the seriousness with which
Sartre took him on as a rival in this area. Moreover, in an interview given in
1975, Sartre acknowledges the importance of Bergson in generating his
interest in philosophy when he was a young man. In his last year at school,
Sartre tells us, a new teacher took over the philosophy class and set the
pupils an essay topic that required them to read Bergson. As Sartre later
remembered it, Bergson’s 
 
Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience
 
was the work that inspired his desire to study philosophy (Sartre, 1975: p. 6).
Another probable reason for the neglect of Bergson’s influence is his
current philosophical insignificance, especially outside France. French
commentators, whose philosophical education includes Bergson, have
shown a far greater awareness of his impact on Sartre. Francis Jeanson’s
early study of Sartre (first published in 1947) shows how many of Sartre’s
views were developed in opposition to Bergson’s, and Descombes’ later
survey of twentieth-century French philosophy recognizes Bergson as an
immensely important figure for the generation of French philosophers that
included Sartre to overcome (Jeanson, 1980; Descombes, 1980). More
recently still, Bernard-Henri Lévy devotes several pages in his study of
Sartre to the neglected influence of Bergson, lists the numerous respects in
which Sartre may be considered a ‘Bergsonian’, and suggests that a ‘retro-
spective illusion’ may have led commentators to attribute many key
Sartrean ideas that might have been (at least in part) inspired by Bergson to
the influence of Heidegger (Lévy, 2003: pp. 102–11).
In this paper I do not try to encompass the large topic, deserving book-
length treatment, of Bergson’s philosophical influence on Sartre overall.
Instead, I propose to focus on one particular, but important, instance of
Sartre’s engagement with Bergson’s thought, in a crucial section of 
 
BN
 
. The
section, entitled ‘Negations’, contains Sartre’s much-cited example of wait-
ing for Pierre in a café: its aim is to establish that negation has its origin in
nothingness, rather than the other way round. Although Sartre mentions
Bergson towards the end of the section (p. 11), he does not name him as the
advocate of the position he is arguing against. Yet, I claim, Bergson is the
implicit target of many of Sartre’s points, and reading the passage with this
in mind throws new light on it.
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Chapter IV of Bergson’s 
 
Creative Evolution
 
 (first published in 1907) is
devoted in large part to a discussion of ‘the idea of nothingness’. (In the
original French this is ‘l’idée du néant’: Bergson and Sartre, then, both use
the same term, 
 
néant
 
. This needs to be noted, as the English translation of
 
Creative Evolution
 
, which often renders 
 
le néant
 
 as ‘the nought’, can mislead
one into thinking that Bergson’s terminology here is different from
Sartre’s.) Bergson aims to discredit the idea of nothingness as ill-founded
and illusory, and describes at great length how this illusion arises. As far as
I am aware, there is no explicit record that Sartre had read this chapter, but
we do know – from a reference in Sartre’s earlier brief discussion of noth-
ingness in 
 
The Imaginary
 
 – that he knew of Bergson’s ‘analyses’, as he puts
it, of nothingness, and although he does not provide a bibliographical
source, it seems safe to assume that Sartre meant the discussion in 
 
Creative
Evolution
 
.
 
1
 
In reconstructing this debate between Bergson and Sartre, I have two
main aims. First, by demonstrating the influence of Bergson on this famous
passage in 
 
BN
 
, to record a little-noticed influence within the history of
philosophy. Second, to examine the arguments about nothingness that
Sartre advances in this passage within this new light. Sartre’s concept of
nothingness is controversial, and many commentators, including sympa-
thetic ones, have found fault with it. A common complaint (voiced as early
as 1945 by A. J. Ayer) is that Sartre uses the term ‘nothingness’ in different
senses at different places, moving surreptitiously – or by means of a pun –
from its everyday meaning to an unacceptable reification of the notion,
whereby ‘nothingness’ comes to refer, after all, to something (Ayer, 1945;
Plantinga, 1958). I do not believe that Sartre can be adequately defended
against this criticism (although of course it is always possible to claim –
unsustainably, in my view – that the points in the text where Sartre incurs it
are unimportant, and may be overlooked as moments of rhetorical excess).
 
2
 
But my concern in this paper is not to attempt a comprehensive defence of
Sartre’s account of nothingness but, rather, to examine the points he devel-
ops against Bergson’s reductive account of it. Even if Sartre’s concept of
nothingness and the use he tries to make of it are ultimately unsatisfactory,
his resistance to Bergson is powerful.
 
3
 
Sartre’s far-reaching ambitions for the concept of nothingness require
him to rescue it from Bergson’s dismissive treatment: his motivation in this
exchange is clear. Bergson’s purpose in dismissing the concept is to remove
a potential obstacle to acceptance of his own account of reality. Some
examination of these respective philosophical and strategic contexts is
required. I briefly examine this larger philosophical perspective at the end
of the paper, where some important convergences of Sartre’s thinking with
Bergson’s are noted (§4). First, though, a look at the details of Bergson’s
discussion of the idea of nothingness (§2), and the arguments with which
Sartre replies to it (§3).
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§2 Bergson’s Analysis of the Idea of Nothingness
 
In chapter IV of 
 
Creative Evolution
 
, Bergson aims to expose two
entrenched philosophical illusions that have, he suggests, impeded the
correct understanding of reality. Both illusions are said to arise in the same
way: the intellect borrows an outlook appropriate for practical matters and
misapplies it to theoretical questions: ‘we import into speculation a proce-
dure made for practice’ (Bergson, 1998: p. 273). The cost of this illicit trans-
fer is high: we are misled by it into taking seriously theoretical questions that
are deeply confused, such as ‘Why is there order, and not disorder, in
things?’ and ‘Why is there something rather than nothing?’ (Bergson, 1998:
pp. 274–6).
The illusion whose analysis dominates the chapter is ‘The Idea of
“Nothing”’. Bergson argues that philosophers have made illegitimate use of
this idea, taking it from contexts in which it has a particular, relative mean-
ing and using it, instead, in an absolute sense. According to Bergson, this
move obscures the dependence of negative experience and judgement on
positive or affirmative ones. Bergson’s strategy is to examine, exhaustively,
the various ways by which philosophers have represented the idea of noth-
ingness to themselves, and to argue, against each in turn, that error is
involved.
In the first place, Bergson argues that we cannot represent ‘Nothing’ by
means of an 
 
image
 
: if we try, we find that all we are in fact representing to
ourselves is some particular ‘suppression’: for example, we may demon-
strate to ourselves the suppression of a current sensation. But this, Bergson
argues, is not the same as an experience of absolute annihilation, because
‘[a]t the very instant that my consciousness is extinguished, another
consciousness lights up … it had arisen the instant before in order to witness
the extinction of the first’ (Bergson, 1998: p. 278). Bergson seems to be
suggesting here that the idea of ‘consciousness-of-nothingness’ involves a
contradiction in terms, like that involved in experiencing one’s own being
dead.
Nor can we, Bergson continues, 
 
conceive
 
 of nothingness. In trying to do
so, he claims, we commit a type of compositional fallacy, by illegitimately
moving from the idea of the annihilation of some 
 
particular
 
 thing to the idea
of nothingness (the annihilation of everything) 
 
per se
 
. But every instance of
‘particular’ annihilation includes the existence of something 
 
instead
 
 of the
annihilated object: our idea of something as non-existent or absent always
implicitly includes the idea of the existence of what is there in its place (or,
if no object has taken its place, of the 
 
empty
 
 place – ‘limited by precise
outlines’ (Bergson, 1998: p. 281) – where it was formerly located). That is
why the move from particular to general is invalid, because it fails to
preserve the element of (existence-presupposing) 
 
substitution
 
 that is inelim-
inable from the particular case: ‘An idea constructed by the mind is an idea
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only if its pieces are capable of coexisting; it is reduced to a mere word if the
elements that we bring together to compose it are driven away as fast as we
assemble them’ (Bergson, 1998: p. 280).
Bergson provides an interesting analysis of the experience of particular
annihilation (or ‘partial nothingness’, as he also calls it (Bergson, 1998:
p. 282)). He claims that a creature whose experience was limited to the
present could never form the idea of absence: ‘There is absence only for a
being capable of remembering and expecting. He remembered an object,
and perhaps expected to encounter it again; he finds another, and he
expresses the disappointment of his expectation … by saying that … he
encounters “nothing”’ (Bergson, 1998: p. 281). The practical context in
which these experiences arise leads Bergson to claim that part of the func-
tion of utterances that contain the words ‘nought’ or ‘void’ is to express the
 
feeling
 
 (of disappointment, say) with which the subject reacts to the reality
he apprehends. The idea of annihilation or partial nothingness involves the
combination of these time-spanning elements of experience: ‘The idea
implies on the subjective side a preference, on the objective side a substitu-
tion, and is nothing else but a combination of, or rather an interference
between, this feeling of preference and this idea of substitution’ (Bergson,
1998: p. 282).
Bergson imagines an opponent accusing him of limiting, with these
‘representations’ of annihilation in terms of operations upon objects, the
ways in which we can think about the non-existent. Perhaps, such an oppo-
nent might argue, with the aid of the ‘pure understanding’, we can think
the non-existence of A 
 
formally
 
, without needing to represent it in terms
applicable to objects that exist in space and time. In reply, Bergson
appeals first to Kant’s famous criticism of the ontological argument,
in which Kant denies that we can represent any object without represent-
ing it as existent: ‘the representation of the existence of the object is insep-
arable from the representation of the object, and indeed is one with it’
(Bergson, 1998: p. 285). From this it follows that to think of A’s non-exist-
ence involves a step 
 
beyond
 
 thinking of it as existent. In fact, Bergson
claims, the thought of A’s non-existence is necessarily indirect: it amounts
to thinking of A as having merely 
 
possible
 
 existence, rather than actual
existence – and this requires, he says, that one think of actual existence as
‘excluding’ it.
Bergson then considers another claim that an opponent might make: that
negation, understood as a function that can be applied to an idea, is symmet-
rical with affirmation: ‘negation, like affirmation, would have the power of
creating ideas, with this sole difference that they would be negative ideas’.
Again, Bergson’s disagreement rests on his claim that negation is less basic,
and more complex, than affirmation. Here he introduces the interesting
idea that negation has a social and pedagogical character, by virtue of its
corrective or admonitory role: 
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The proposition, ‘This table is not white’, implies that you might
believe it white, that you did believe it such, or that I was going to
believe it such. I warn you or myself that this judgment is to be
replaced by another (which, it is true, I leave undetermined). Thus,
while affirmation bears directly on the thing, negation aims at the
thing only indirectly, through an interposed affirmation.
(Bergson, 1998: p. 288)
In short, negation is ‘an affirmation of the second degree’.
 
4
 
 Negation,
although complex in this way, is not ‘a complete act of the mind’ (Bergson,
1998: p. 287). It does not serve to record just how things 
 
are
 
, but rather that
they are not as they were (or might have been) 
 
thought to be
 
, and this detour
via how things were (or might have been) 
 
represented
 
 by someone leaves the
nature of reality ‘undetermined’.
Bergson suggests that one might be misled into believing negation and
affirmation to be symmetrical by the fact that both are expressed in propo-
sitions that employ the ‘artificially created’ concepts of a language: within
this conventional framework it may appear that negative judgements are no
less directly descriptive of reality, and no less ‘social’, than affirmative ones.
From this point of view, he concedes, the symmetry claim appears correct.
Yet he insists that analysis at this level is superficial, ‘the symmetry alto-
gether external’ (Bergson, 1998: p. 292); to appreciate this, one must
consider how the intellect functions or would function in isolation from the
contribution of language. 
Suppose language fallen into disuse, society dissolved, every intellec-
tual initiative, every faculty of self-reflection and self-judgement atro-
phied in man: the dampness of the ground will subsist none the less,
capable of inscribing itself automatically in sensation and of sending a
vague idea to the deadened intellect. The intellect will still affirm, in
implicit terms.
(Bergson, 1998: p. 292)
This obviously problematic appeal to a supposedly primitive form of intel-
lectual human life (where society is absent) is supposed to support, yet
again, Bergson’s claim that negation has no immediate grounding in reality,
but involves a ‘subjective’ point of view that can be sustained only by beings
with sophisticated faculties (of memory, for example), and that its use is
primarily social. Bergson does not give a satisfactory explanation of the
relevance of this appeal to a counterfactual ‘pre-linguistic’ human reality,
but it is noteworthy again that he has a greater sense than Sartre that there
may be a linguistic dimension to the understanding of negation that requires
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its own level of analysis. (For Sartre, ‘language’ belongs to the domain of
intersubjectivity: it falls within the topic of being-for-others, which is not
treated until Part III of 
 
BN
 
.)
 
§3 Sartre’s Reply to Bergson
 
BN
 
 was not the first work in which Sartre, in developing his conception of
nothingness, had felt the weight of Bergson’s thinking about the topic. In
 
The Imaginary
 
 (Sartre, 2004, first published in 1940), Sartre argued that the
intentional objects of the imaginative consciousness are non-existent: they
are posited as 
 
néants
 
, ‘nothingnesses’. In a passage towards the end of the
book, Sartre suggests that we need to avoid committing ourselves to the idea
that an ‘intuition of nothingness’ is possible, and defers to Bergson’s discus-
sion of this matter. 
There cannot be an intuition of nothingness, precisely because noth-
ingness is nothing and because all consciousness – intuitive or not – is
consciousness of something. Nothingness can be given only as an
infrastructure of something. The experience of nothingness is not,
strictly speaking, an indirect experience, but is an experience that is,
on principle, given ‘with’ and ‘in’. Bergson’s analyses remain valid
here: an attempt to conceive death or the nothingness of existence
directly is by nature doomed to fail.
(Sartre, 2004: p. 187)
In this paragraph Sartre leans on Husserl’s ‘principle of intentionality’ –
that all consciousness is consciousness of something – to 
 
support
 
 Bergson’s
scepticism about the possibility of an ‘intuition of nothing’. Since such an
intuition would conflict with Husserl’s principle, Sartre argues, it cannot be
possible: the ‘something’ to which consciousness must always be intention-
ally related cannot be a nothing.
By 
 
BN
 
, Sartre’s attitude towards Bergson has become more bullish.
Although the section entitled ‘Negations’ does not state that the view under
attack is Bergson’s, Sartre begins by setting out exactly Bergson’s objections
to the idea of non-being, attributing them to an anonymous ‘someone’: 
Furthermore ordinary experience reduced to itself does not seem to
disclose any non-being to us. I think that there are fifteen hundred
francs in my wallet, and I find only thirteen hundred; that does not
mean, 
 
someone will tell us
 
, that experience had discovered for me the
non-being of fifteen hundred francs but simply that I have counted
thirteen hundred-franc notes. Negation proper (we are told) is
unthinkable; it could appear only on the level of an act of judgement
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by which I should establish a comparison between the result antici-
pated and the result obtained.
(
 
BN
 
, p. 6; my italics)
As Sartre sums it up, this view makes two claims, both of which he wishes
to discredit. First, that negative judgement is a ‘subjective act’ only, and
does not correspond to a ‘negative’ reality: ‘being-in-itself is full positivity
and does not contain in itself any negation’ (
 
BN
 
, p. 6). (However, although
Sartre wishes to reject this ‘subjectivist’ reduction, his own view makes an
apparent concession to it, which he acknowledges early on in the discussion:
‘It is evident that non-being always appears within the limits of a human
expectation’ (
 
BN
 
, p. 7). We will return to this concession, whose precise
import is unclear.) Second, that there is no distinctive phenomenon denoted
by the term ‘nothingness’ (
 
le néant
 
): ‘ordinary experience reduced to itself
does not seem to disclose any non-being to us’ (
 
BN
 
, p. 6). But, this line of
thought continues, if the term does not refer to anything directly ‘disclosed’
to us, we can understand it instead as referring to the abstract idea of a nega-
tive judgement, perhaps the form that such judgements share: ‘A proposi-
tional function of the type, “X is not”’ (
 
BN
 
, p. 6). An implication of this
second claim, of course, is that our idea of nothingness is derived from the
idea of negative judgement.
The purpose of Sartre’s famous example of looking for Pierre in the café
is to falsify this implication: Sartre believes that it illustrates a case in which
a negative judgement is ‘conditioned’ by non-being, rather than the other
way round (
 
BN
 
, p. 45). In suggesting that this example illustrates the possi-
bility of an 
 
intuition
 
 of Pierre’s absence, Sartre appears not only to be
disagreeing with Bergson, but to reject the Bergsonian caution in relation
to the idea of ‘an intuition of nothing’ that, in 
 
The Imaginary
 
, he had
respected: 
At first sight it seems absurd to speak here of intuition since to be
exact there could not be an intuition of nothing and since the absence
of Pierre is this nothing. Popular consciousness, however, bears
witness to this intuition. Do we not say, for example, ‘I suddenly saw
that he was not there.’
(
 
BN
 
, p. 9)
 
5
 
Sartre’s attitude here may seem puzzling. His earlier reason for following
Bergson’s caution about an ‘intuition of nothing’ was, we saw, connected
with his belief in Husserl’s principle of intentionality. But this principle is
strongly reaffirmed in 
 
BN
 
: indeed, it plays an important role in Sartre’s
Introduction to the book, in establishing the necessity of transphenomenal
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being. How, then, can Sartre now allow that we can be intentionally related
to ‘nothing’, rather than ‘something’?
In fact, Sartre finds a way of reconciling these ideas. His brilliant solu-
tion is to take on, from Gestalt psychology, an account of perception that
emphasizes the structured, organized nature of the perceptual field. If, as
Gestalt theory holds, all visual experience involves a ‘figure’ that stands
out against a ‘ground’, Pierre’s 
 
absence
 
, in this example, is the figure. Here
the figure is a void: it stands out, against the ground of the café, as an antic-
ipated but 
 
missing
 
 presence; it is like a promise of a presence that, before
the searching eyes of his friend, continually fails to materialize. So Sartre
can maintain the possibility of an ‘intuition of nothing’ without betraying
Husserl’s principle: Pierre’s friend is intentionally related to ‘something’,
to his 
 
absence-in-this-café
 
. Sartre has found a way of admitting an experi-
ence of nothingness while respecting the constraint that he accepted in 
 
The
Imaginary
 
: that nothingness ‘can be given only as an infrastructure of
something’.
Sartre’s account persuasively describes an important phenomenological
difference, overlooked by Bergson. The experience of seeing that ‘Pierre is
not here’ is 
 
not
 
 the same as the experience of seeing that ‘All these people
are here’ – even if across the two cases the population of the café is identi-
cal. The second experience does not involve the flickering ‘figure’ that
structures the former. Sartre’s account of this perceptual event is consistent
with the more general account of our being-in-the-world advanced in 
 
BN
 
(and influenced by Heidegger), according to which our apprehension of
reality is always informed by our particular aims and preoccupations.
Pierre’s absence is made salient – for his friend – by the expectation that he
will be there.
Sartre’s thought experiment and the theory of perception that it deploys
present a forceful challenge to Bergson’s scepticism about negative ‘intu-
ition’. Moreover, Sartre’s alternative brings into view the connection
between what a philosopher will think about the possibility of intuiting
nothingness and their wider account of the relation between the perceiving
subject and reality. At least for the purposes of his argument about nothing-
ness, Bergson appears to hold that ‘objective’ reality appears in the same
way to all human observers, in relation to which our differing ‘subjective’
expectations about it can be contrasted. (Recall Bergson’s claim, quoted
earlier, that the idea of partial nothingness implies ‘on the subjective side a
preference, on the objective side a substitution and is nothing else but … an
interference between this feeling of preference and this idea of substitution’
(Bergson, 1998: p. 282).) Sartre, instead, proposes a ‘theory-laden’ account
of perception, such that our expectations about what we are going to see
make a difference to what we in fact 
 
do
 
 see.
Whatever contrast between ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ Sartre intends, it
is not the 
 
same
 
 contrast as Bergson’s. And we can see Sartre’s repudiation
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of Bergson’s concept of objectivity as a reason for the concessive remark
that we noted earlier: ‘It is evident that non-being always appears within
the limits of a human expectation’ (
 
BN
 
, p. 7). If the appearance of non-
being – Pierre’s absence – is always conditioned by human expectation, that
is because 
 
all
 
 appearances are conditioned in that way. (Sartre does not put
the point in this way because, I think, he wants at this stage to focus just on
nothingness. But it would be compatible with a great deal else that he says
to put it that way.)
So far, then, we have a powerful Sartrean case, resting on phenomenolog-
ical considerations about the way in which we encounter the world, against
Bergson’s claim that it is impossible to have an ‘intuition of nothing’. And
this can be appreciated independently of the ontological ambitions with
respect to ‘nothingness’, mentioned earlier, that lead Sartre to push beyond
these insights, into claims that are far less tenable. Let us turn now to
Sartre’s response to the other problem he considers – the 1,500 francs – and
his challenge to Bergson’s claim that all negative judgements can be
converted into affirmative ones. 
We believed for a moment that the negation could arise from the
comparison instituted between the result anticipated and the result
obtained. But let us look at that comparison. Here is an original judge-
ment, a concrete, positive psychic act which establishes a fact: ‘There
are 1300 francs in my wallet.’ Then there is another which is [again, no
more than] an establishing of fact and an affirmation: ‘I expected to find
1500 francs.’ There we have real and objective facts, psychic and posi-
tive events, affirmative judgements. Where are we to place negation?
(
 
BN
 
, p. 11)
 
6
 
Sartre is claiming here that Bergson’s ‘conversion’ into affirmative judge-
ments does not work. It fails to record, as the negative judgement does, the
negative ‘fact’: that there 
 
are not
 
 (as I had thought) 1,500 francs in my
wallet. For that negative content to be recorded, something further would
need to be added to the affirmative judgements. One might add, for exam-
ple, ‘the 1,300 francs are not what I expected’ – but then one reintroduces
negation. Or if one tries, instead, to avoid negative vocabulary, by empha-
sizing that ‘there are 
 
only
 
 1,300 francs’, it looks as if one has simply got rid
of 
 
explicit
 
 negative vocabulary (‘not’), but not of the implicit negative
meaning (‘only’ means ‘no more than’). Sartre’s rejection of the possibility
of a genuine elimination of the negative meaning is reminiscent of Bertrand
Russell’s defence, twenty-five years earlier, of ‘negative facts’ in the period
of his logical atomism.
 
7
 
 Bergson’s attempt to rewrite negative judgements
as affirmative ones, Sartre suggests, either leaves some essential content
out, or merely disguises it.
 
8
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Sartre’s anti-Bergsonian line of thought is compelling, and casts strong
doubt on what we might think of as Bergson’s ‘affirmativist’ prejudice.
 
9
 
Sartre’s defence of negative judgements against Bergson’s reductionism,
however, does not stop there. As mentioned earlier, he argues in addition
that negative judgements, far from giving rise to a (pseudo-) concept of
nothingness, are (except when they are false) 
 
founded
 
 on nothingness, or
non-being.
It is with this line of thought – accounting for ‘nothingness’ at the onto-
logical or metaphysical level – that Sartre, clearly and heavily influenced by
Heidegger, runs into difficulty.
 
10 In vindicating Sartre’s phenomenological
account of the possibility of an intuition of nothingness, we did not need to
dwell on the Heideggerean ontological claim into the service of which he
presses the example: that is, that nothingness is at the origin of negative
judgement, rather than the other way round. (Pierre’s absence as ‘intuited’
by his friend is supposed in this way to precede, by grounding, the judge-
ment that ‘Pierre is not here.’) The same ontological agenda is involved in
the case of the 1,500 francs: Sartre believes that negative judgements must
themselves be grounded – and they cannot be grounded, he thinks, on being.
Thus he rejects a possible position according to which ‘being’ grounds all
judgements about it – affirmative and negative ones – equally. Rather,
Sartre insists, negation involves us in a different relationship to being from
affirmation: ‘negation is a refusal of existence’, and ‘negation … must tear
us away from this wall of positivity which encircles us’ (BN, p. 11; my italics).
We encounter here the attempt to ontologize or substantivize nothing-
ness about which critics have complained. Sartre moves beyond phenome-
nologically persuasive descriptions of ‘negative’ experience to advance
further, paradoxical, claims about the ground of such experience. To a
persuasive account of the ‘haunted’ café, experienced in terms of the flick-
ering ‘figure’ that structures the perception of Pierre’s expectant friend,
Sartre adds, as it were, the existence of the ghost (in the shape of Pierre’s
non-being). And, in the case of the 1,500 francs, he moves from a claim
about the irreducibility of the negative content in the judgement that ‘the
1,500 francs are not in the wallet’ to the claim that the basis of this judge-
ment is the 1,500 francs (that are missing) in the wallet.11
Moreover, although Sartre uses the terms ‘objective’, ‘subjective’ and ‘real’
in his discussion, their meaning, within his philosophical framework, is
obscure.12 As has often been noted, Sartre’s conception of being-in-itself
(of being as it is, or would be, independently of human consciousness of it)
is of no help here.13 Being-in-itself, according to Sartre, lacks any determi-
nacy, as it is wholly undifferentiated: ‘Transition, becoming … all that is
forbidden on principle. For being is the being of becoming and due to this fact
it is beyond becoming. It is what it is…. It knows no otherness’ (BN, p. xlii).
If objective reality is something about which humans are able to judge, it
cannot be equated with being-in-itself, which is ‘beyond affirmation’.14 The
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articulation of being arises only with its relationship to consciousness (being-
for-itself), with the advent of a human world. But if human consciousness
is the source of all determination, how are we to distinguish between subjec-
tive and objective apprehensions of reality? An obvious suggestion,
supported by some aspects of the role Sartre attributes to the Other, is to
equate objectivity with intersubjective agreement. But this would prevent
Sartre from asserting, as he does, that the ‘objective fact’ of Pierre’s absence
in the café has a foundation in reality that judgements such as ‘Wellington is
not in the café’ lack.
Sartre’s claim that being owes its determinations to human consciousness
also undercuts his claim that it is specifically negation that ‘tear[s] us away
from this wall of positivity’: once we have reached the level at which any
judgement about reality is made, we have already breached the ‘wall of posi-
tivity’, by articulating it. Contrary to the asymmetry that Sartre tries to
establish, affirmative and negative judgements are on a par here.
Thus, while Sartre is right to suggest that the distinction made between
subjective and objective elements in Bergson’s account of nothingness is not
the only option, his own treatment of the subjective/objective distinction
leaves a shortfall.15 In consequence, the connection that Sartre does wish to
make between non-being and the human perspective – expressed in his
concessive claim that ‘non-being always appears within the limits of a
human expectation’ (BN, p. 7) – is not, if we take it as a contribution to the
question about non-being’s objectivity, satisfactorily explained.16
These difficulties with Sartre’s account have been pointed out by others,
and I do not intend to discuss them further here. My aim has been to draw
attention to the more neglected cogency of his case against Bergson. If his
own account of nothingness is fraught with difficulty, Sartre has nonetheless
provided some good reasons to reject Bergson’s ‘affirmativism’. Perhaps,
like many philosophers, he was more gifted as a critic than as a creator.
§4 ‘Whence Comes it, and How can it be Understood, that Anything 
Exists?’ (Bergson, 1998: p. 275)
This is a question that troubles Bergson, and that lies behind his reductive
account of nothingness. In this section I step back from the detail of that
account in order to consider the wider concern that motivates it. Bergson’s
attitude towards the problem of the origin of existence can then be
compared with Sartre’s. The comparison shows up some important aspects
of Sartre’s thinking where he appears to be following a Bergsonian prece-
dent. If so (and here I only point out their convergence), the importance and
extent of Sartre’s debt to Bergson are confirmed. Even the paradoxical
ontology that Sartre assigns to nothingness may owe something positive to
Bergson’s influence: Sartre disagrees with Bergson’s treatment of nothing-
ness, but seems nonetheless to have learned from it.
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I will indicate, and briefly consider, three topics on which Sartre’s think-
ing can be brought into relation with – and is perhaps informed by – the
philosophical positions that constitute the background to Bergson’s discus-
sion of nothingness: (i) contingency, (ii) the legitimacy of metaphysical
questions and (iii) the ontology of nothingness.
(i) Bergson makes it clear that the need to demystify the idea of nothing-
ness arises at least in part from its contribution to another ‘mystery’ that has
puzzled philosophers: the question about the origin of existence quoted in
the title of this section. Because of the connection between the idea of noth-
ingness and this metaphysical question, there is more at stake in the enquiry
into the former than may at first appear: 
Philosophers have paid little attention to the idea of the nought. And
yet it is often the hidden spring, the invisible mover of philosophical
thinking. From the first awakening of reflection, it is this that pushes
to the fore, right under the eyes of consciousness, the torturing prob-
lems, the questions that we cannot gaze at without feeling giddy and
bewildered.
(Bergson, 1998: p. 275)
In Bergson’s view, the metaphysical question arises as a problem only if
one presupposes the validity of the idea of nothingness. If one thinks it intel-
ligible that there could ‘be’ nothingness, one will naturally want to know
how being arises, how it manages to ‘fill’ the emptiness or void, how it
makes its ‘conquest over nought’ (Bergson, 1998: p. 276). And if one accepts
the legitimacy of that question, then some accounts of being will be ruled
out. In particular, Bergson believes that his own philosophy of duration (la
durée) will appear to be inadequate, insofar as it fails to establish (or even
aspire to establish), that duration – a psychological reality – must necessarily
exist. Bergson thinks that if one accepts the requirement that an adequate
account of being must show how it can ‘drive out’ nothingness, one will need
to rule out any non-necessary being. Only existents of some ‘logical’ type
will do.17 
If I ask myself why bodies or minds exist rather than nothing, I find no
answer; but that a logical principle, such as A = A, should have the
power of creating itself, triumphing over the nought throughout eter-
nity, seems to me natural.
(Bergson, 1998: pp. 276–7)
For Bergson, then, an illusory belief in the idea of nothingness lends a
spurious difficulty to a metaphysical question that, in turn, wreaks further
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damage on our philosophical understanding by leading us to rule out, in the
light of its requirements, the correct account of reality. (As mentioned
earlier, it is a merit of Bergson’s own account of reality that it can explain,
in its own terms, how these illusions arise: by dint of the intellectual distor-
tion that often arises when we import ‘into speculation a procedure made
for practice’ (Bergson, 1998: p. 273).)
Bergson is concerned, then, to reject an entrenched perspective from
which the assertion of the contingency of existence appears problematic.
This concern anticipates Sartre’s conviction, from his earliest philosophical
writings, of the same contingency, and his (frequently hostile) repudiation
of systems of thought – especially religious ones – that incorporate necessity
and/or finality within their account of worldly existence. In some of Sartre’s
pre-BN works, contingency is even more central a theme than freedom. His
novel Nausea, published in 1938, had the working title ‘A Factum on
Contingency’, and the nausea that it describes is occasioned precisely by the
realization of the brute, unjustifiable and contingent fact of being.18
In BN, Sartre declares that both types of being (being-for-itself and
being-in-itself) whose concrete synthesis the book examines are contingent
(and he continues to connect the apprehension of this fact with the experi-
ence of nausea).19 However, Sartre rejects the traditional way of under-
standing contingency: the claim that being-in-itself is contingent should not
be understood as equivalent to the claim that it ‘might have been otherwise’.
Rather, its contingency consists in the ‘brute fact’ that there is being-in-
itself. Relative to any explanatory schema, it is de trop and cannot be
derived from anything else. 
Being-in-itself is never either possible or impossible. It is. This is what
consciousness expresses in anthropomorphic terms by saying that
being is superfluous … that is, that consciousness absolutely cannot
derive being from anything, either from another being, or from a
possibility, or from a necessary law. Uncreated, without reason for
being, without any connection with another being, being-in-itself is de
trop for eternity.
(BN, p. xlii).
(ii) Like Bergson, Sartre believes that some metaphysical questions are
illegitimate. In particular he argues, in the Introduction to BN, that ques-
tions about the origin of being-in-itself often wrongly presuppose the appli-
cability of the concepts of ‘activity’ and ‘passivity’. This false presupposition
invalidates all ‘creationist’ hypotheses about the in-itself, whether they
hypothesize either that God created it (which, Sartre says, would imply its
passivity), or that it is self-created (and hence ‘active’). The consequence of
Sartre’s restriction of the applicability of a great many concepts to the
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domain of the for-itself is that very little can be said about the in-itself,
considered in isolation: Sartre’s affirmation of its contingency sits alongside,
rather than in conflict with, a sense of its inexplicability.
In his Conclusion to BN, Sartre returns to the topic of the two ‘types of
being’ in order to consider some ‘metaphysical implications’, and he picks
up the line of thinking begun earlier: care is needed, he claims, to avoid asking
invalid questions. Sartre rules out all ‘why’ questions about being-in-itself,
arguing that all ‘whys’ presuppose the existence of the for-itself and can’t,
therefore, be applied to being-in-itself in isolation.
Sartre’s argument for dismissing certain metaphysical questions as
‘devoid of meaning’ is similar in structure to Bergson’s: both claim that the
acceptability and intelligibility of some questions are context-dependent.
While Bergson identifies an unjustified transition from a practical to a ‘spec-
ulative’ use of reason, Sartre sees in these questions an unacceptable
attempt to remove them from the framework in which alone they make
sense: ‘all … “Whys” in fact are subsequent to being and presuppose it’ (BN,
p. 619; my italics). Neither Bergson’s ‘nothingness’ nor Sartre’s ‘why’ can
properly figure in questions about the origin of being.
(iii) As we have seen, although Sartre, like Bergson, dismisses some meta-
physical questions as misconceived, he does not follow Bergson in dismiss-
ing the idea of nothingness. Even so, albeit by a different argumentative
route, Sartre converges with Bergson in denying that there is any need to
show how being manages a ‘conquest’ over nothingness. For Sartre, such a
requirement distorts, by inverting, the relationship between being and noth-
ingness: nothingness is parasitical on, and so cannot ‘pre-exist’, being.
Sartre’s objections to the derivative status, in relation to judgement, that
his opponents (including Bergson) assign to nothingness can cause one to
lose sight of the fact that he believes that nothingness is secondary in rela-
tion to being. It is important to notice Sartre’s adherence to these two
doctrines, which pull him in opposite directions: on the one hand, the reality
of nothingness, which can lead him into its reification; on the other, its non-
being, which requires it, parasitically, to batten off being. This second
doctrine reminds us why Sartre needs to add the term ‘Nothingness’ to
‘Being’ in the title of his book (nothingness is not a sub-class of being), but
also raises the bewildering question of what has been added. Hence the
familiar puzzle over whether Sartre counts as a dualist, if one term of the
putative dualism does not even exist.
Sartre accuses Hegel of overlooking this essential asymmetry. For Sartre,
Hegel’s error is to portray nothingness (or non-being) as a counterpart, a
symmetrical ‘opposite’, to being.20 Rather, Sartre insists, being has priority
over nothingness, both logically and metaphysically: nothingness consists
only and always in the negation of some particular existent. (Sartre observes
that language reflects this fact: ‘language furnishes us with a nothingness of
things and a nothingness of human beings’ (BN, p. 15).)21 Hegel wrongly
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characterizes being and non-being as equally abstract ‘contraries’: ‘In a
word, we must recall here against Hegel that being is and that nothingness
is not’ (BN, p. 15).
Sartre’s disagreement with Bergson about nothingness is subtler and
more complicated than may at first appear. This shows up in the fact that
Bergson and Sartre are often classed together as anti-Hegelians with respect
to nothingness. It may even be that, in addition to provoking his dissent,
Sartre’s encounter with Bergson’s treatment of nothingness helped to
propel him towards his firmly anti-Hegelian position. That mixture of
appropriation and opposition would be in keeping with Sartre’s typical reac-
tion to his philosophical predecessors.22
University College London, UK
Notes
1 Bergson’s arguments about nothingness in Creative Evolution were also
published separately, as a self-standing article, in the Revue Philosophique for
1906, which makes it still more likely that it was these that Sartre had come
across – either within the book or in the philosophical journal.
2 The following passage provides an example of the use of the concept of nothing
that critics have attacked (the italicized words in particular). Here Sartre puns on
the word ‘nothing’, arguing that ‘it’ can make a difference to how things are,
rendering determinism false. 
If we consider the prior consciousness envisaged as motivation, we see …
evidently that nothing has just slipped in between that state and the
present state. There has been no break in continuity…. Neither has there
been an abrupt interpolation of an opaque element to separate prior from
subsequent…. Nor is there a weakening of the motivating force of the prior
consciousness; it remains what it is, it does not lose anything of its urgency.
What separates prior from subsequent is precisely nothing. This nothing is
absolutely impassable, just because it is nothing; for in every obstacle to be
cleared there is something positive which gives itself as about to be cleared.
(BN, pp. 28–9; my italics)
3 In response to a question raised by an anonymous referee for this journal, and in
case other readers have the same concern, I need to emphasize that I am isolating
Sartre’s anti-Bergsonian claims and purposes in BN from other claims that he
makes about nothingness, and other ends for which the concept is elaborated (the
most important of which is, of course, to establish the existence of human free-
dom). I see nothing illegitimate in this separation, and am certainly not suggesting
that Sartre would have been content to make only those anti-Bergsonian claims
that I pick out for attention here. Were it to be alleged that this separation over-
looks the unity of Sartre’s concept of nothingness, my reply would be to deny that
the concept possesses any such indissoluble unity.
4 This reply to the opponent’s claim, although interesting, sidesteps the challenge:
instead of considering whether negative ideas might be symmetrical with positive
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ones, Bergson discusses what is involved in utterances of negative judgements. It
is worth noting though that the ‘intersubjective’ dimension of negation is some-
thing that Sartre, in his discussion, largely ignores. Robert Stone (1981) criticizes
Sartre for neglecting this dimension too, in his account of bad faith, but also
draws attention to the fact that Sartre begins his discussion of that topic by noting
the existence of ‘men (e.g. caretakers, overseers, gaolers,) whose social reality is
uniquely that of the Not, who will live and die, having forever been only a Not
upon the earth’ (BN, p. 47).
5 This rhetorical question appears to be a wholesale borrowing from Heidegger’s
lecture ‘What is Metaphysics’, in which Heidegger approaches this question by
asking: ‘What about this nothing? Is it an accident that we talk this way so auto-
matically? Is it only a manner of speaking – and nothing besides?’ (Heidegger,
1929: p. 84). Heidegger’s attempt in that lecture to show that nothing (Nichts) is
more fundamental than negation clearly inspired Sartre’s demonstration of the
same conclusion. This may be a case of the type Lévy mentions: Heidegger’s
obvious influence eclipses Bergson’s.
6 The square brackets indicate my revision of Barnes’ English translation, which
is faulty at this point.
7 In his lectures on ‘The Philosophy of Logical Atomism’ Russell considered an
‘eliminativist’ proposal about the interpretation of negative propositions
advanced by Demos that is very similar to Bergson’s, and rejects it: ‘the suggestion
offered by Mr Demos is that when we assert “not-p” we are really asserting that
there is some proposition q which is true and is incompatible with p…. I find it
very difficult to believe that theory of falsehood. You will observe that in the first
place there is this objection, that it makes incompatibility fundamental … which
is not so very much simpler than allowing negative facts’ (Russell, 1918: pp. 68–9).
8 Sartre makes exactly this point (although not explicitly against Bergson) a page
before he introduces the 1,300 francs. Here he considers the reductive claim that
a negative answer to the question ‘Is there any conduct which can reveal to me
the relation of man with the world?’ does not reveal the non-being of such a
conduct, but rather ‘that the conduct sought is a pure fiction’. Sartre denies that
the reduction is genuine: ‘to call this conduct a pure fiction is to disguise the
negation without removing it. “To be pure fiction” is equivalent here to “to be
only a fiction”’ (BN, p. 5).
9 I borrow the term ‘affirmativist’ from Juliette Simont (1998: p. 35). Simont
mentions a tradition, or school, of ‘affirmative’ thinkers in which philosophers
have often placed Bergson: Leibniz–Spinoza–Nietzsche–Bergson–Deleuze. Of
course the ‘affirmativism’ of these thinkers varies hugely, but Simont’s remark
invites reflection on the many possible purposes and implications of an ‘affirma-
tivist’ stance (and, equally, of the opposition to it).
10 As mentioned earlier, Sartre’s way of presenting the problem of nothingness, as
well as many of his formulations, borrows heavily from Heidegger’s lecture
‘What is Metaphysics?’. He plays down his debt to Heidegger, and plays up his
differences, by only referring to that lecture in the later section of his chapter
(IV) in which he states points of disagreement with Heidegger’s conception of
nothingness.
11 See Buchdahl (1961) for helpful discussion of these issues. (It is pointed out,
for example, that it would be wrong to construe someone’s claim that he
hasn’t had any food for days as the claim that he has been nourished by nega-
tive food (p. 173).)
12 Some examples of Sartre’s use of this vocabulary are: his support for the claim
that nothingness is ‘the structure of the real’, his denial that non-beings should
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be ‘reduced to pure subjectivity’ (both at BN, p. 7) and his description of the
discovery of Pierre’s absence as ‘an objective fact’ (BN, p. 10).
13 Pettit (1968) gives an illuminating account of these difficulties, and notes that
‘the problem of the objective basis for the human world of change and variety …
silently disturbs all Sartre’s work’ (p. 181).
14 Sartre confusingly sometimes writes ‘being’ when (as the context usually
makes clear) he ought to put ‘being-in-itself’. It is clear that in claiming that
‘Being is equally beyond negation as beyond affirmation’ (BN, p. xli), he
means being-in-itself.
15 Wahl’s (1946) hostile response to Sartre’s account of nothingness makes much of
the unsatisfactory definitions of the terms ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’.
16 In the amplifying remarks that immediately follow this claim Sartre fails to
clarify whether, by ‘human expectation’, he means the expectation of an indi-
vidual, a wider community or humanity in general. He goes on to illustrate the
point with the example of the ‘negative’ phenomenon of destruction. This,
Sartre tells us, is relative to human consciousness because it is from that view-
point that the preservation of towns, buildings and so on matters. (In the
absence of these human interests, one might see an earthquake, say, merely as
a redistribution of matter.) But if human consciousness is the source of all
differentiation in ‘being’, it seems that there is nothing especially subjective or
‘human’ about phenomena such as destruction: earthquakes, houses, towns
are all on the same footing. Or if they are not, Sartre needs to show why not,
by introducing some more distinctions to explain how within an articulated
and anthropocentric world, negative phenomena are more dependent on a
human perspective than others. See Caws, 1984: pp. 68–9 for discussion of this
point.
17 Here Bergson is surely over-reacting. After all, the question whose intelligibility
he rejects is not asking why there must be existence, but why there is existence.
So perhaps an answer that explained the origin of some contingent existence
would suffice.
18 Even earlier, Sartre’s posthumously published ‘Carnet Dupuis’, a notebook
whose jottings date from 1930–1, shows his preoccupation with the topic.
19 ‘Being will be disclosed to us by some kind of immediate access – boredom,
nausea, etc.’ (BN, p. xxiv).
20 In his discussion of Hegel, as elsewhere, Sartre shifts between the terms ‘noth-
ingness’ and ‘non-being’, presumably to respect Hegel’s preference for the latter
term. But for Sartre’s purposes, the terms are interchangeable.
21 Unfortunately, this point cannot successfully be made in English: in French, but
not in English, there are different constructions (‘ne … rien’ and ‘ne …
personne’) for ‘things’ and for ‘people’. Hazel Barnes comments frostily that
‘Sartre here has conveniently based his ontology on the exigencies of a purely
French syntax’ (Translator’s Note, BN, p. 15).
22 Thanks to: the Department of Philosophy at University College London for the
period of sabbatical leave during which this paper was written; Bruce Baugh and
Vincent de Coorebyter for helpful orientation; and, especially, Sebastian Gardner
for his numerous illuminating emails about Sartre.
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